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ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW:
IMPLICATIONS FOR AN EFFECTIVE GLOBAL
WARMING REGIME
DAVID G. VICTOR*
SUMMARY
Collective management often requires formal commitments as
well as mechanisms for enforcing compliance.  Current efforts to slow
global warming have focused on commitments and given scant atten-
tion to enforcement.  They have followed the “standard model” when
creating international environmental treaties: set commitments first,
defer procedures for enforcement until later, and rely on “soft” (or
nonexistent) measures for enforcing compliance.  However, the evi-
dence that supports use of the “standard model” is misleading and
does not apply to global warming.  In most international environ-
mental agreements, it has been possible to defer or ignore enforce-
ment procedures because nearly all commitments have been modest
and enforcement has not been necessary.  What little wisdom exists
on the design of enforcement procedures is based heavily on the ex-
perience in the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer.  But a close look at that experience shows that defer-
ring the creation of enforcement procedures—in particular, the Pro-
tocol’s “Non-Compliance Procedure”—until after most commitments
were in place severely weakened the procedures, because countries
that feared strong enforcement would consent only to a soft mecha-
nism.  The few countries that have brazenly violated the agreement
(e.g., Russia) are changing their behavior only in response to incen-
tives—especially large compensation programs and threats of trade
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sanctions—that are actually external to the Protocol’s enforcement
system.  By itself the Protocol’s hobbled enforcement process has
been able to handle only relatively minor violations for which its
small carrots and sticks are adequate.
The design of an effective global warming regime must focus on
enforcement mechanisms as well as commitments.  Failure to do so
will only perpetuate the shallowness of international environmental
law—commitments that appear bold but have little direct impact on a
country’s behavior except where changes in behavior are in the coun-
try’s self-interest.  This article reviews the record of compliance with
and enforcement of international environmental agreements.  It also
examines the prospects for enforcement under major alternative
types of commitments that might be included in a global warming re-
gime.  A system of tradable permits is most vulnerable to unraveling
if cheating is rampant, but a trading system in which permit-holders
are liable for noncompliance (“buyer liability”) is the easiest to en-
force because the market would impose enforcement with price sig-
nals.  Flaky permit sellers would command a lower price than trust-
worthy vendors.  However, the concept of emission trading, which is
included in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on global warming, will be still-
born because it requires the impossible task of distributing permits
worth trillions of dollars.  That leaves other alternatives, such as co-
ordination of carbon taxes or other national policies, which are not
easily enforced.
Policymakers are thus in a quandary.  If they focus on setting
prices or quantities of emissions, they must overcome a huge hurdle—
enforcement—for which prior experience with international envi-
ronmental law (e.g., the Montreal Protocol) is an imperfect guide and
conventional wisdom is worse than no guide at all.  Mechanisms much
more powerful than those offered by the “standard model” will be
needed.  Policymakers could focus commitments on “liberal states” in
which internal public pressure, for example, from environmental
groups, and robust legal systems make it possible to enforce interna-
tional commitments from inside (ground-up) rather than the outside
(top-down).  But international cooperation on prices and quantities
that is restricted to such nations is unlikely to slow global warming by
much, because those states account for a declining fraction of the
emissions that cause global warming.
One partial solution is based on the fact that the liberal nations,
which are most likely to comply with demanding commitments, are
also the major centers of technological innovation.  Carbon-intensive
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energy is the most important source of global warming.  Over a pe-
riod of five decades and beyond—the time-scale that is most relevant
for global warming—technological change can eliminate emissions of
greenhouse gases, probably at remarkably low cost because that time
scale is longer than the turnover of capital stock.  A regime that coor-
dinates efforts to promote development and deployment of new en-
ergy technologies could focus on these liberal nations, and the re-
sulting new technologies could spread worldwide from this innovative
core through the normal operation of private markets.  Some rules on
quantities and prices would also be needed to promote diffusion, but
they would be complements rather than central elements of interna-
tional collective action on global warming and less needy of strong
enforcement.  Such a regime is not as elegant as coordinating world
prices or quantities—which, in principle, would be economically most
efficient—but it has an attribute that pure price and quantity ap-
proaches probably lack: it could work.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Studies of cooperation typically find that enforcement is neces-
sary when parties have an interest in defecting.1  That presents a seri-
ous problem for international relations because truly solving many in-
ternational problems would require demanding agreements that are
prone to defection.2  Yet the mechanisms for enforcing international
agreements are typically weak.3  This article considers three topics in
1. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and
Strategies, Theories and Method, in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 1, 24 (Kenneth A. Oye et
al. eds., 1996).
2. Truly solving most international environmental problems would require substantial and
costly interventions in the economy that would affect competitiveness of firms and give firms
and governments an incentive to skirt their obligations.  For example, stabilizing the atmos-
pheric concentration of greenhouse gases, necessary to stop global warming, could cost trillions
of dollars if required over the next several decades.  There is little precedent revealing how in-
ternational agreements work when the stakes are so high.  However, the imperfect record of
compliance with trade agreements suggests that high stakes lead to incentives to defect. See
ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 362 (1993).  Furthermore, the long history of suspicions about
noncompliance with arms control agreements illustrates the concern that governments have
about noncompliance.  For a review of the compliance literature, see J.H. Ausubel & D.G. Vic-
tor, Verification of International Environmental Agreements, 17 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV’T 1
(1992).  For more theoretical treatments of the issues, which lead to the conclusion that incen-
tives to defect are strong when stakes are high and reciprocal enforcement is not available
(which is often true when managing public goods like environmental quality), see Oye, supra
note 1, at 19-20; George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News about Compliance Good News
about Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379 (1996) [hereinafter Downs et al., Good News?].
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international environmental politics that are related to that problem.
First, if enforcement mechanisms are poor, why does the record of
compliance with international environmental agreements show that
compliance is high?  Second, in the few cases where compliance has
not been perfect, what has been learned about the effectiveness of
mechanisms for enforcement?  Third, what does the historical experi-
ence with international environmental agreements imply for the crea-
tion of an effective regime to limit the effects of global warming?
The discussion is based mainly on evidence developed in a large-
scale research project at the International Institute for Applied Sys-
tems Analysis (IIASA)4 and a new project on global warming and
technology at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).5
3. Only two of the major multilateral environmental agreements have functioning and
active compliance mechanisms: the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, art. VIII, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 1101-03, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, 250-
51 (the “infractions reports” system) [hereinafter CITES]; and the Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, art. 8, 26 I.L.M. 1550, 1556 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1989) (the “Non-Compliance Procedure”) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].  For an
overview of the field of international environmental law that comes to this conclusion, see the
authoritative study prepared for the secretariat of the United Nations Commission on Environ-
ment and Development [hereinafter UNCED]: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A SURVEY OF EXISTING LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 8-14 (Peter
H. Sand ed., 1992) [hereinafter EFFECTIVENESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS].  This
survey also identifies the European Community’s (EC’s) directives on environment as multilat-
eral and, of course, environmental, and also subject to the European Union enforcement proce-
dure. See id. at 14.  However, the EC is a special case precisely because of the existence of pow-
erful EC institutions and is not generalizable to other areas of international law.  Since the 1992
study, the Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on
Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, June 14, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1540 (not yet entered into
force) [hereinafter 1994 Sulfur Protocol] has been negotiated and includes provisions for a non-
compliance procedure.  Furthermore, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, May 9, 1992, art. 13, 31 I.L.M. 849, 866 (entered into force March 21, 1994) [hereinafter
Climate Change Convention], available at <http://www.unfccc.de/resource/conv/index.html>,
also includes a “multilateral consultative process” that, in part, is intended as a mechanism for
reviewing compliance.  The design of both draws heavily on the Montreal Protocol’s Non-
Compliance Procedure, which is widely seen as a success and is the most recent “model” avail-
able to diplomats when they sit down to craft a new procedure.  The Non-Compliance Proce-
dure thereby replicates itself, though remarkably little attention is given to whether and why the
Montreal “model” has been successful and whether and how it might be applied in other situa-
tions.  For additional review and discussion, see DAVID G. VICTOR, THE EARLY OPERATION
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL’S NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE (Int’l
Inst. for Applied Sys. Analysis Executive Report ER-96-2, 1996) [hereinafter VICTOR, EARLY
OPERATION] available at <http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Publica tions/Documents/ER-96-002.html>.
4. See THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE ix (David G. Victor et al. eds.,
1998) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS].
5. See David G. Victor, Energizing Prometheus: Technological Innovation for a Carbon-
Free Economy (visited on Feb. 1, 2000) <http://www.cfr.org/public/resource.cgi?pub!3245>
(summarizing the CFR project).
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II.  THE RECORD OF COMPLIANCE
More than 140 multilateral environmental agreements govern
behavior related to dozens of international environmental issues.6
Scholars have examined closely only a fraction of these agreements
and issue-areas, but most studies have uncovered a common puzzle:
despite the rarity of enforcement mechanisms, generally countries
have complied with their international environmental commitments.7
At first glance, the outlook for international environmental co-
operation seems dismal.  Solving environmental problems would re-
quire a demanding collective effort. The needed international com-
mitments would be costly to implement, and incentives to defect
would be high.8  Yet, nearly every international environmental
agreement lacks a formal mechanism for rigorous monitoring of com-
6. The business of counting international agreements yields wildly varying estimates, prin-
cipally for three reasons: (1) most counts include nonbinding agreements, which are practically
innumerable and not well-classified and thus the total count is more of a guess than a real count;
(2) some counts include the international environmental directives of the EU, which are also
numerous (as mentioned above, supra text accompanying note 3, the EC is a special case that
yields much stronger law than is possible in the rest of the international system); (3) some stud-
ies include the many bilateral agreements that pertain to environment, although bilateral
agreements have a quite different character from multilateral ones because bilateral pacts are
easier to negotiate and easier to enforce through reciprocity and thus do not expose many of the
most difficult problems of crafting and maintaining effective multilateral environmental law;
and (4) counts vary in the way they include agreements that were not principally negotiated for
environmental purposes, such as the 1992 Treaty on European Union (“Maastricht Treaty”) or
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which obviously affect behavior and legal
interpretations that, in turn, affect the environment.  The author’s count of 140 is of the main
multilateral environmental agreements, of which about two dozen have been the subject of
nearly all serious analysis.  In this article, the term “agreement” is used generally to mean any
agreement—binding, nonbinding, explicit, or tacit.  There are essentially no tacit agreements
that govern multilateral environmental behavior because the behavior that causes multilateral
environmental problems is so complex and nontransparent that it is not conducive to the emer-
gence of tacit agreements.  Moreover, because the field is heavily legalized, norms are typically
and quite rapidly legalized into some form of explicit agreement.  For more on the conditions
that are favorable to tacit cooperation, see ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION (1984); GEORGE W. DOWNS & DAVID M. ROCKE, TACIT BARGAINING, ARMS
RACES, AND ARMS CONTROL  (1990).  The World Conservation Union (IUCN) also maintains
a list of agreements which numbered 430 as of March 1, 1997.  The Consortium for International
Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) has developed a subset of that list that includes
agreements related to one of nine global environmental issues.  That subset numbers 328.  For
more information, see CIESIN’s computerized treaty resource at ENTRI Treaty Texts (last
modified Nov. 23, 1999)  <http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/texts-home.html>.
7. See Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, Conclusions, in INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS, supra note 4, at 659, 661 (“[A]lmost all countries comply
with almost all of their binding international commitments.”); ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA
HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 3-4 (1995).
8. See supra text accompanying note 2.
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pliance.9  Most agreements require countries to report data on their
own activities (“self-reporting”), which in principle makes it possible
to assess levels of compliance.10  Yet in practice, studies have shown
that the quality of self-reported data is rarely checked closely, and in
most cases little is done with the data.11  Even if compliance problems
were spotted, practically none of the multilateral environmental
agreements has formal provisions to apply tough enforcement re-
sponses, such as sanctions.12  In spite of these conditions, compliance
with binding international environmental commitments, where it has
been measured, is high—often perfect.13
Three factors explain such puzzling high levels of compliance: (1)
the shallowness of international environmental cooperation; (2) self-
enforcement; and (3) inducements including compensation and sanc-
tions.
A.  The Shallowness of International Cooperation
George Downs et al. have already given the chief explanation for
the puzzle of compliance: high compliance is the consequence of
shallow cooperation.14  Truly solving the main issues on the interna-
tional environmental agenda would require deep cooperation, with
attendant incentives for defection and the need for monitoring and
9. See EFFECTIVENESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 8-14.
10. See Ausubel & Victor, supra note 2, at 17-18; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
Rep. No. GAO/RCED-92-43, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS ARE NOT WELL MONITORED 2 (1992).
11. For an overview of the current situation—including the lack of use of data and, conse-
quently, generally low attention to data quality—see Raustiala & Victor, supra note 7.
12. As has already been stated, supra text accompanying note 3, few agreements have any
provision for scrutinizing compliance or handling noncompliance.  Of those that do have such
provisions, such as CITES and the Montreal Protocol, the powers available to the procedure are
minimal—mainly exhortation.  Formal sanctions are not available to either of those agreements,
although they can recommend sanctioning activity.  There are some examples where sanctions
have been applied in CITES. See Peter H. Sand, Commodity or Taboo? International Regulation
of Trade in Endangered Species, GREEN GLOBE Y.B., 1997, at 19, 21-22 (discussing temporary
sanctions, for example, applied against Italy).  And there are examples of threats of sanctions
used very effectively against Russia for noncompliance with the Montreal Protocol. See VICTOR,
EARLY OPERATION, supra note 3, at ¶ 1.  But these examples are few, and in the ozone layer
case the threats were not actually delivered by the formal Non-Compliance Procedure, which
does not have such powers.  Efforts to give the Procedure such powers were scuttled by Parties
that worried that the powers might be used against them; for more discussion on this topic, see
David G. Victor, The Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol’s Non-Compliance
Procedure, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS, supra note 4, at 137, 140-42
[hereinafter Victor, Operation and Effectiveness].
13. See Raustiala & Victor, supra note 7, at 661; CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 3-4.
14. See Downs et al., Good News?, supra note 2, at 387-97.
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enforcement.15  As Arild Underdal showed nearly two decades ago in
his study of fisheries agreements, international cooperation often
follows the “law of the least ambitious program:”16 the lowest com-
mon denominator prevails.
Empirical evidence broadly supports the view that international
environmental cooperation is shallow.  Although scores of agree-
ments are in force, few of the issues on the environmental agenda
seem to be solved; commitments reflect what countries are already
doing rather than what is needed to address the problem at hand.  In
Europe, for example, the first targets for cutting the emissions that
led to acid rain were signed in 1985 and required only a 30% cut (be-
low 1980 levels) in SO2 emissions.
17  These commitments typified
shallow cooperation—for many countries they cost little (at the mar-
gin) to implement and did not affect competitiveness, and for most
countries they had little effect on behavior.18  Although eight years
were allowed for compliance, several countries had complied when
the ink on the 1985 Sulfur Protocol was barely dry because they were
already regulating SO2 emissions as a leading cause of urban air pollu-
tion.19  The sulfur commitments codified programs that governments
and firms already had under way.20
Similarly, the 1972 London Dumping Convention,21 which is fa-
mous for banning ocean dumping of high-level (and now also low-
level) radioactive materials, was spearheaded by the United States
because the US had already passed national legislation to halt such
dumping. For the US and scores of other countries that had no inten-
15. See id. at 395-97.
16. ARILD UNDERDAL, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT:
THE CASE OF THE NORTHEAST ATLANTIC 17, 36 (1980).
17. See Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on
the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Per Cent,
July 8, 1985, 1480 U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter 1985 Sulfur Protocol]; Marc A. Levy, International
Co-operation to Combat Acid Rain, GREEN GLOBE Y.B., 1995, at 59, 60 (1995) [hereinafter
Levy, International Co-operation].
18. For analysis of the actual effects of the sulfur agreement, see Marc A. Levy, European
Acid Rain: The Power of Tote-Board Diplomacy, in INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES
OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 75, 115-31 (Peter M. Haas et
al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Levy, European Acid Rain]; Levy, International Co-operation, supra
note 17.
19. See Levy, International Co-operation, supra note 17, at 60.
20. See id.
21. See Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Dumping of Wastes at Sea,
Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403 [hereinafter London Dumping Convention].
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tion of dumping waste into the seas, the treaty yielded symbolic bene-
fits while requiring no change in behavior.22
In part, the lack of serious ambition in international environ-
mental agreements is a consequence of environmentalism as a mass
movement.  Especially in liberal democracies, where public opinion is
both fickle and essential to political survival, governments are con-
stantly on the prowl for actions that have low short-term costs and
high symbolic value.  When under pressure to deal with an interna-
tional environmental problem that could have high short-term costs
and distant international benefits, politicians are politically wise to
sidestep by signing a treaty that is superficially significant but actually
requires little action.
In the terms of game theory, cooperation has been focused on
problems that are easy to solve—games of harmony or simple coordi-
nation.23  In practice, international environmental cooperation has
rarely attempted real collaboration, where commitments are de-
manding and defections are common, unless they face strong penal-
ties (enforcement) or inducements (compensation) to implement
costly measures and sustain the collective effort.24  Many such col-
laboration problems are on the international agenda, but interna-
tional agreements result only when the problem has been re-framed
as a less ambitious collective effort.  Analysts have too quickly
equated the type of problem that is the subject of cooperation (e.g.,
protection of the ozone layer or protection of endangered species)
with a specific type of cooperation game—such as harmony, coordina-
tion, or deadlock.
In reality, every environmental issue has within it a myriad of co-
operation games.  For example, the effort to protect wetlands spans a
spectrum of cooperation games from a game of harmony (e.g., gov-
ernments agree to declare their intention to protect wetlands) to one
of coordination (e.g., governments agree to focus wetland protection
22. The treaty also established a backstop against future dumping, although it remains un-
clear whether that is a benefit or a curse.  By removing ocean floor disposal as an option, the
ban has forced land-based solutions to radioactive waste disposal; yet, disposal in the oceans
may be environmentally superior to keeping waste on land.
23. See Oye, supra note 1, at 2.
24. For an example of a rare attempt, see Montreal Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 8. The
existence of the Non-Compliance Procedure is, in part, evidence of that serious attempt.  The
negotiators also created an exemption for “essential uses” so as to avoid cooperation in areas
where costs would be extremely high because ozone-benign substitutes did not exist. See
RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE
PLANET 204-05 (2d ed. 1998).
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efforts on wetlands along bird migration corridors) to deep collabora-
tion (e.g., every government agrees to costly measures that, collec-
tively, ensure protection of bird migration routes) and finally to a
game of deadlock (e.g., governments agree not to alter wetlands from
their natural state and to forfeit $1 billion in escrow if they do not
comply).  The global 1971 Ramsar Convention,25 which is the focus of
international legal efforts to protect wetlands, is at the harmony end
of the spectrum.  A country can comply with the Ramsar provisions
by listing one wetland site and making minimal efforts to protect it;
there is no legal penalty for noncompliance.  Other regional agree-
ments that affect wetlands attain more toward coordination and col-
laboration.  In Western Europe, transborder wetland protection
agreements are particularly strong.  In Central America an effort is
under way to create a biodiversity corridor from South America to
Mexico that, if successful, would become among the few examples of
serious multilateral collaboration on wetlands.26  Efforts at deadlock,
by definition, do not lead to agreement—although even in those
cases, diplomats often find a symbolic agreement they can adopt to
indicate the effort was not for naught.
The multiplicity of problems helps to explain why there are so
many treaties. As soon as an issue appears on the international
agenda, an effort is almost immediately launched to negotiate an
agreement.  If the treaty-making process were focused on reaching
agreements to solve the environmental problem at hand, treaty regis-
ters would be practically empty.  International environmental coop-
eration would be focused on collaboration, which requires sophisti-
cated agreements and powerful institutions for enforcement, and thus
is difficult to achieve.  Instead, the negotiating process is more of an
effort to identify the problem type that can earn agreement. Willing-
ness to pay is often low when negotiations begin, but failure to reach
agreement yields symbolic costs; thus, the negotiation process is often
a joint effort to discover an agreement marked by harmony or simple
coordination.  Unsurprisingly, many agreements result, participation
in those agreements is high, the lowest common denominator reigns,
25. See Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl
Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 11,084, 996 U.N.T.S. 245 [hereinafter Ramsar Convention].
26. See National Aeronautics and Space Administraion & Central American Commission
on Environment and Development, The NASA/CCAD Mesoamerican Biological Corridor Proj-
ect (visited Feb. 1, 2000) <http://ghrc.msfc.nasa.gov/ccad/english/index.html>.
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and compliance is nearly perfect.27  Thus, issues that arrive on the en-
vironmental agenda can quickly yield a stable, shallow agreement.
Over the last 25 years—from the 1972 Stockholm Conference to
the present—the efficiency of this search for shallowness has seemed
to increase as participants and institutions have learned how to play
the game.  It has become easier to agree on formats and language be-
cause models can be adapted from the scores of precedents.  Institu-
tionalization has facilitated further institutionalization.  Indeed, it is
remarkable that although ever-more complicated issues arrive on the
international environmental agenda, the time required to negotiate
treaties has remained relatively constant and short, typically about
two years from the start of formal negotiations to adoption.  The con-
trast with international trade diplomacy is striking: as more complex
issues have appeared on the trade agenda, such as regulating non-
tariff trade barriers, it has become increasingly difficult to reach
agreement.  The latest expansion of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT)—which created a package of 22 agreements
on a wide range of topics, including enforcement and the World
Trade Organization (WTO)—required eight years of nearly constant
negotiation to achieve.28  One reason for the difference may be that
environmental cooperation must play to a mass public that demands
visible progress—symbolic actions are better than inaction.29  In other
27. See Downs et al., Good News?, supra at 2, at 379-80.
28. The exact number of agreements depends upon the definition of “agreement.”  For this
total, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization is included, as well as the 21
agreements listed in the four annexes to that WTO agreement.  A smaller number (18) is ob-
tained by excluding plurilateral agreements, which are agreements not adopted by all parties.  A
larger number results if the list were to include the six agreements related to interpretation of
the 1994 GATT.  For example, the following treaties relating to 1994 GATT can be considered
as separate agreements: the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995); the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade 1994, with Understandings (6), and Marrakesh Protocol, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1154 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995); and the General Agreement on Tariffs in Services, Apr.
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995).
29. Of course, the conclusion is stated baldly.  It seems that, over time, the stringency of
commitments also has increased, mainly for three reasons.  First, stakeholders have become
more confident that they can meet commitments in a given issue-area as they gain experience,
and technological change has made it cheaper to do so.  The Montreal Protocol, for example,
has strengthened over time in part because technological innovation has made benign substitu-
tions for ozone-depleting substances available to the market.  See BENEDICK, supra at 24, at 218.
In other terms, games that were previously viewed as “collaboration” or difficult “coordination”
problems have shifted to easier problems.  Second, the willingness to pay for environmental pro-
tection has increased generally, and with that the willingness to pay for specific environmental
problems has also increased.  The main factor that explains this shift is the spread of democratic
institutions and environmental values, which is discussed infra Part II.B.  Third, some innova-
tions in international environmental institutions have made it possible to negotiate agreements
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areas of international cooperation, such as trade and banking, the
need for symbolic acts may be lower and thus the supply of codified
agreements may match more closely the willingness to implement sig-
nificant actions.  Perhaps commercial markets take less solace in sym-
bolic agreements.
B.  Liberal States and Self-Enforcement30
Shallowness is not the only reason for high levels of compliance.
In some cases countries agree to and implement costly actions they
would not undertake in the absence of an international agreement.
Governments are under pressure from their own populations to ad-
dress international environmental problems.  This internal pressure to
comply is strongest in advanced industrialized democracies, or “lib-
eral” states, where, typically, three factors are present.31  One is that
they are wealthy and have tackled more pressing environmental
problems, such as providing clean, piped water and basic sanitation.32
They perceive that they can afford to spend resources on the envi-
ronment and can worry about uncertain distant risks that are charac-
teristic of the issues on the international environmental agenda.
Second, these societies are also typically open and democratic.
Freedom of association makes it possible for non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) to translate new ideas into political action.  In
closed and undemocratic societies, new ideas yield action only at the
pace by which insulated elites discover and embrace new ideas.
Openness spreads and refines new ideas across political borders.  The
result is a synchronicity in the international environmental agenda
among liberal states as ideas diffuse rapidly through networks of indi-
viduals and NGOs.  The power centers of those networks are typically
in the advanced industrialized countries—leading some NGOs in the
developing world to lament that the “international” environmental
agenda is actually captured by an elite of northern NGOs and backed
that better capture the willingness of parties to conclude agreements.  In particular, the devel-
opment of compensation and other incentive mechanisms has been crucial. See discussion infra
Part II.C.  The reader should not conclude that all of international environmental politics is the
search for shallowness and symbols.
30. Much of this section is based on the analysis in Raustiala & Victor, supra note 7.  In his
thinking about the role of “liberal” states, the author is especially grateful to the analysis of
Anne-Marie Slaughter. See Anne-Marie Burley, Toward an Age of Liberal Nations, 33 HARV.
INT’L. L.J. 393, 393-405 (1992) (defining “liberal” states and analyzing their role).
31. See Raustiala & Victor, supra note 7, at 689-90.
32. See id. at 689.
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by their governments.33  The combination of openness and democratic
polities eases the transmission of these ideas into the political deci-
sion-making process.  Liberal states, having similar values, are loosely
synchronized in their willingness to tackle new environmental con-
cerns as they arise.
Third, liberal societies have independent judiciaries and other in-
stitutions for checking the actions of government.  Successful cam-
paigns to put environmental ideas into action often result in legisla-
tive decisions that can be judicially enforced if politicians and
administrators fail to live up to legislative mandates.  And when judi-
cial strategies fail, other avenues—media campaigns, lobbying, and
boycotts—are available to encourage compliance.  More work is
needed to unravel the mechanisms at work and the conditions under
which they are most effective.  For example, in principle the courts
are often available to enforce compliance with international trea-
ties—especially in countries whose constitutions give international
law priority over domestic rules.34  In practice, that power is rarely
used.  Media-based strategies appear to be effective when the issue
can be translated into one of mass concern, which is not always possi-
ble or efficient when detailed technical issues of compliance are at
stake.  And in some liberal nations—notably the United States—it is
increasingly difficult to discern “government” from “non-
government” because the elites often cycle between official and non-
official roles.  It is therefore increasingly difficult (and perhaps
meaningless) to distinguish public from private action.
None of these three mechanisms is automatic or perfect, but to-
gether they provide pressure from within countries to propose, adopt,
and implement international environmental commitments.  The latter
two factors discussed, openness and democratic decision-making, and
independent judiciaries—the hallmarks of “liberal states”—are
seemingly the most important factors.  Material wealth, though im-
33. For example, the headquarters of the NGOs that have been most active on interna-
tional environmental issues are all in industrialized countries.  These NGOs are Greenpeace
International (Amsterdam), Environmental Defense (New York), Natural Resources Defense
Council (New York), and Friends of the Earth (London).  For more on patterns and problems
of NGO influence, see P.J. Simmons, Learning to Live with NGOs, FOREIGN POL’Y, Fall 1998,
at 82.
34. See J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 (10th ed. 1989) (noting
that in Germany “general rules of public international law . . . form part of federal law, and . . .
take precedence over the laws of and create rights and duties directly for the inhabitants of the
federal territory”).  For a discussion of the relationship between international and domestic law,
see HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 553-88 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d ed.
1966).
VICTOR_FINAL_PAGEPROOF.DOC 08/15/00  9:24 AM
1999] ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW 159
portant, is often over-emphasized.  The problem, of course, is that all
these causal factors are correlated, and it is difficult to analyze each
variable independently.
The power of liberalism largely explains why every advanced in-
dustrialized country has complied with its obligations to phase out the
most noxious ozone-depleting substances, as required under the
Montreal Protocol.35  Most Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) countries are phasing out ozone-
depleting substances even more rapidly than required under the Pro-
tocol.36  There remain, however, some areas where action has been
imperfect—notably, smuggling of ozone-depleting substances has
proven difficult to regulate.37  But these are symptomatic of the diffi-
culty that governments have in regulating illicit substances in any so-
ciety that is open to the world; they do no worse in tackling these
problems than in trying to stem the flow of illegal drugs.38  In the ab-
sence of the Montreal Protocol, it is doubtful that the advanced indus-
trialized countries would have banned essentially all of the most
noxious ozone-depleting substances so quickly.  Once in place, how-
ever, the Protocol was self-enforcing due to reputation costs.  No
government of a major industrialized country wanted to be caught—
by its own public, not some international police force—failing to do
its part to tackle a threat that animated the public.
The power of mass opinion helps to explain why some issues lead
to action while others do not.  Limited attention budgets favor issues
that are easily grasped and which generate fears of catastrophe.  The
combination of the depletion of the ozone layer and increased fears
of cancer probably helped to push democratic governments to agree
to limit ozone-depleting substances.  Of course other factors, notably
scientific assessments, were also important—rarely is environmental
science so clear-cut as was the proof that the ozone hole is caused by
humankind.39  Also, environmental values lead to contagion effects.
35. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 2.
36. See Victor, Operation and Effectiveness, supra note 12, at 147 (“Most OECD countries
are phasing out ODS more rapidly than is required by the Protocol’s commitments.”).
37. See DUNCAN BRACK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL 105-
14 (1996) (describing the illegal trade in Russian ozone-depleting substances (ODS) in the U.S.,
Asia, and Europe).
38. On the general failures of border control in regulating drugs, see Stephen E. Flynn, The
Global Drug Trade versus the Nation-State: Why the Thugs are Winning, in BEYOND
SOVEREIGNTY: ISSUES FOR A GLOBAL AGENDA 44 (Maryann K. Cusimano ed., 1999).
39. See J.G. Anderson et al., Ozone Destruction by Chlorine Radicals Within the Antarctic
Vortex: The Spatial and Temporal Evolution of CIO-O3 Anticorrelation Based on In Situ ER-2
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It probably helps advance the cause of greenhouse gas regulation that
many people confuse global warming with the depletion of the ozone
layer, which is now widely viewed as a proven problem.  But conta-
gion and misunderstanding cut both ways.  Many of the most vitriolic
attacks on the science of global warming are driven, in fact, by fear
that the global warming agenda is but one installment in a left-wing
plot to regulate the economy.  For those infected with that contagion,
every new environmental issue is viewed, first, as a regulatory threat.
The spread of liberalism—and with it, values and pressures for
action—thus helps to explain why few efforts to govern environ-
mental problems have ever confronted the strong pressure to defect.
Compliance has been high not only because international cooperation
has been built on trivial commitments but also because liberal states
have undertaken most of the non-trivial commitments.40  Cooperation
has been effective, in part, because the countries that have agreed to
undertake onerous commitments have been those for which the
spread of environmental values and political pressures has been most
pervasive and thus the internal incentives to comply have been great-
est.41  International agreements are a yardstick against which liberal
forces can assess whether countries are doing their part to solve a
problem of public concern—in Marc Levy’s terms, a visible “tote-
board” on which countries can post their intentions, measure prog-
ress, and suffer scorn when they fall short.42
C.  Inducements: Compensations and Sanctions
Shallowness probably explains the high supply of treaties with
high levels of compliance.  And over the long run, the liberal theory
of international relations probably best explains the spread of more
serious efforts to address international environmental issues.  How-
ever, nature does not always cooperate.  Tackling many problems—
especially global ones—requires actions by countries that are neither
liberal nor wealthy.  And in some cases those nations have adopted
and implemented stringent commitments.43  The explanation for this
Data, 94 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 11,465, 11,465 (1989) (providing the results from measurements
in the ozone hole from a converted U-2 spy aircraft).
40. See Raustiala & Victor, supra note 7, at 696-97.
41. See id.
42. See Levy, European Acid Rain, supra note 18, at 77.
43. For example, the developing countries in the Montreal Protocol have undertaken to
phase out most ozone depleting substances by 2006.  See infra note 47 for the compliance
schedule on the Montreal Protocol.
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behavior—action without the internal pressure that liberal, advanced
industrialized countries face—is almost always compensation.
Countries that face little internal incentive to change their be-
havior can be induced to action if others pay the bill.  Thus it is now
customary for global environmental accords to include funds to pay
the extra cost of compliance.44  To date, the biggest success has been
the Montreal Protocol’s Multilateral Fund (MLF), which is distribut-
ing nearly $1 billion to compensate developing countries for the cost
of phasing out ozone-depleting substances.45  Without the Fund, few
of those countries would be members of the Montreal Protocol and
even fewer would be undertaking significant actions to meet the Pro-
tocol’s commitments.46  Developing countries must phase out the most
noxious ozone-depleting substances ten years after the industrialized
countries completed their phase-out—that is, by 2006.47  Interim as-
sessments show that the developing countries are generally on track
44. Earlier multilateral environmental agreements included either no funding mechanism
(e.g., the CITES) or only ambiguous promises to fund environmental protection on an ad hoc
basis (e.g., the Ramsar Convention).  In contrast, all three of the multilateral environmental
treaties that emerged from the 1992 UNCED include legal provisions for an institutionalized
financial mechanism. See Climate Change Convention, supra note 3, at art. 11; Convention on
Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, art. 20, 31 I.L.M. 818, 830 (entered into force Sept. 29, 1993)
[hereinafter Biological Diversity Convention]; Convention to Combat Desertification in Those
Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, Sept. 21,
1994, Part III, arts. 20, 21, 33 I.L.M. 1328, 1347-50  [hereinafter Desertification Convention].
The Desertification Convention was concluded long after UNCED but is properly viewed as a
direct product of that conference.  At this writing, the only other new major global environ-
mental treaty to be concluded since UNCED concerns trade in chemicals and pesticides: 1998
Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and
Pesticides in International Trade, Jan. 1999, 38 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter PIC Convention or Rotter-
dam Convention]. The PIC Convention does not include a financial mechanism, but for good
reasons: the fundamental purpose of PIC is to shift responsibility for regulating trade in hazard-
ous chemicals and pesticides from importers (developing countries) to exporters (industrialized
countries).  Thus, its main objective—in addition to helping to build up the capacity of devel-
oping countries to regulate these substances within their borders—is to build capacity by
changing trade regulation and only to a lesser degree through funding of activities within devel-
oping countries.  For more on financial mechanisms, see INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
AID: PITFALLS AND PROMISE (Robert O. Keohane & Marc A. Levy eds., 1996) [hereinafter
INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AID].
45. For more on the MLF, see Elizabeth R. Desombre & Joanne Kauffman, The Montreal
Protocol Multilateral Fund: Partial Success Story, in INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AID,
supra note 44, at 89.
46. See id. at 94-96 (giving their assessment that the fund was crucial to getting the devel-
oping countries on board).  In particular, a coalition led by India refused to agree to strengthen
the Protocol in 1990 unless a compensation fund was established.
47. For a summary of the phase-out schedule, see United Nations Environmental Pro-
gramme, Phase Out Schedule (last modified May 8, 2000) <http://www1.unep.org/ozone/Phase-
Out-Schedule-4-Art-5.htm>.
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to achieve this goal and that the elimination of large quantities of
ozone-depleting substances can be traced directly to projects spon-
sored by the Multilateral Fund.48
The Montreal Protocol’s Fund was created in 1990; nearly every
major global environmental treaty adopted since then has included a
financial mechanism modeled on the Fund.49  Typically, the deal is the
same: industrialized countries compensate developing countries for
the “agreed incremental costs” of compliance.50  In theory, those
funds should be distributed according to the implementing nation’s
propensity to comply—more liberal nations should get less while
stubborn, illiberal, and poor countries would reap fuller compensa-
tion.  Putting such a scheme into practice, however, would be fantas-
tically difficult; it would only encourage stubbornness and would re-
quire subtle political decisions for which global institutions such as
the United Nations are not famous.  Thus, compensation packages
typically are offered to all developing countries on equal terms.
The coin of compensation has another side: coercion.  In some
cases, threats of trade sanctions have helped to induce countries to
meet international commitments.51  Often compensation and sanc-
tions are implemented in tandem.  The Montreal Protocol, for exam-
ple, threatens trade sanctions against countries that do not join the
regime and rewards the developing countries that do join with com-
pensation.52  Faced with those external incentives, no smart govern-
ment would stay outside.  Indeed, nearly every nation on Earth has
joined the Protocol—the 157 members include even the rogue nation
48. The Multilateral Fund now has approved country programs in 98 countries, which rep-
resent 95% of all consumption of ozone-depleting substances by eligible (Article 5) countries.
For a review of its progress in eliminating ozone-depleting substances, see United Nationa Envi-
ronmental Programme, Report of the Executive Committee to the Tenth Meeting of the Parties to
the Montreal Protocol ¶¶ 21-25 (last modified May 29, 2000) <http://www.unep.org/ozone/
OzL.Doc-10.6.htm>.
49. In particular, see the three new global environmental treaties that emerged from the
UNCED process referred to supra note 44: the Climate Change Convention, the Biological Di-
versity Convention, and the Desertification Convention.  The other new, major global environ-
mental agreement, the PIC Convention, was not a direct result of UNCED.
50. For the origin of this language, see Montreal Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 10.1.
51. For example, the threat of trade sanctions against Iceland for its whaling activities. See
Steinar Andresen, The Making and Implementation of Whaling Policies: Does Participation
Make a Difference?, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS, supra note 4, at
431, 456-62.
52. For the sanctions against joiners, see Article 4 of the Montreal Protocol, supra note 3;
for the reward, see Article 10 of the Montreal Protocol, supra note 3.
VICTOR_FINAL_PAGEPROOF.DOC 08/15/00  9:24 AM
1999] ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW 163
North Korea (joined in 1995); Iraq is among the very few non-
members.53
III.  ENFORCEMENT: SYSTEMS FOR IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW
Thus, the history of international environmental cooperation is
studded with cases in which external enforcement has not been neces-
sary to achieve high levels of compliance.  Historically, cooperation
has been present under conditions where enforcement is not neces-
sary (shallow or empty cooperation), where pressure to comply is in-
ternal to the member states (especially in liberal states), and where
inducements have eliminated the incentive to defect.
Governments could create enforcement mechanisms and make
deeper cooperation possible, but many have been wary of empower-
ing institutions to impose obligations.54  The function of enforcement
is typically discussed as vital during the negotiation of international
environmental agreements; but just as typically such mechanisms are
left on the cutting room floor when agreements are finalized.55  For-
mal mechanisms, where they exist at all, are eviscerated of any real
power.56  It has become customary to defer the design of any compli-
ance procedure until after the treaty itself is established, rather than
53. For the list of signatories to the Montreal Protocol, see United Nations Environmental
Programme, Status of Ratification/Accession/Acceptance/Approval of the Agreements on the
Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer (visited Feb. 1, 2000) <http://www.unep.org/
ozone/ratif.htm>.
54. See generally Victor, Operation and Effectiveness, supra note 12 (providing the story of
the development of the Montreal Protocol’s Non-Compliance Procedure, which was weakened
by countries wary of being held accountable in front of the procedure).
55. A poignant example is the development of enforcement procedures in the Climate
Change Convention, supra note 3.  The early negotiations included the design of elaborate pro-
cedures, but in the end all were stripped away because some parties feared being held account-
able.  All that remains is a short Article 13, entitled “Multilateral Consultative Process,” which,
in essence, deferred creation of an enforcement mechanism until later.  That time is now.  A
weak Article 13 system, modeled on the Montreal Protocol’s Non-Compliance Procedure, is
under active discussion.  On the early discussions related to compliance mechanisms in the Cli-
mate Change Convention, see Jo Elizabeth Butler, The Establishment of a Dispute Resolu-
tion/Noncompliance Mechanism in the Climate Change Convention, 91 PROC. AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L. 250 (1997).
56. The only active mechanisms are the system of infractions reports under CITES and the
Montreal Protocol’s Non-Compliance Procedure.  Both have had significant effects on behavior;
they have been effective not because of their formal powers, however, but rather because their
existence can mobilize stronger informal powers.  For an assessment of the CITES system, see
EFFECTIVENESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 3; Sand, supra note 12.  For an
assessment of the Montreal Protocol system, see Victor, Operation and Effectiveness, supra note
12.
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to view compliance control as an integral part of negotiating com-
mitments.57
Because cooperation has been shallow and compliance high, it
has been difficult to determine which enforcement strategies work
best against noncompliance in different situations.58  The record is too
thin to resolve with empirical tests the debate between Downs et al.—
who argue that enforcement, including sanctions, is needed to deter
and reverse noncompliance when cooperation is demanding59—and
Chayes and Chayes—who argue that noncompliance is rarely willful
and thus best managed with incentives and pressure rather than sanc-
tions.60  At stake is not only a theory of compliance, but also dramati-
cally different policy prescriptions for how to design effective mecha-
nisms for addressing noncompliance.
To the extent that either view can be tested, the evidence sug-
gests that both warrant some support.  Because cooperation has been
shallow, Chayes and Chayes are correct in claiming that noncompli-
ance is mainly the result of miscalculation and unplanned changes in
circumstances.61  Under those conditions, the managerial approach62
they advocate does seem to be effective (perhaps because stronger
measures are often unavailable).  Countries sign up to commitments
only when they think they can comply; thus, noncompliance is the re-
sult of misjudgment and circumstances beyond the control of the
country.63  The search for shallowness means that most cases of non-
compliance fall into the category of non-willful violations for which
the Chayes and Chayes remedies are most appropriate.
However, the fact that managerial techniques have been the
common formal response to noncompliance problems is not incom-
patible with the Downs et al. claim that hard measures, such as sanc-
tions, are needed when cooperation is more demanding and incen-
57. None of the three UNCED treaties nor the PIC Convention, supra note 44, include a
developed compliance mechanism.  The PIC Convention is typical in its brevity on the matter:
“The Conference of the Parties shall, as soon as practicable, develop and approve procedures
and institutional mechanisms for determining non-compliance with the provisions of this Con-
vention and for treatment of Parties found to be in non-compliance.” Id. at art. 17.
58. See Raustiala & Victor, supra note 7, at 661.
59. See Downs et al., Good News?, supra note 2, at 387.
60. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 22-28 (“[T]he principal source of noncompli-
ance is not willful disobedience but the lack of capability or clarity or priority, [thus] coercive
enforcement is as misguided as it is costly.”).
61. See id. at 10, 22.
62. See id. at 22-28; Downs et al., supra note 2, at 379 (referring to the empirical work of
Chayes and Chayes and others as the “managerial” school).
63. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 10.
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tives to defect are higher.64 A study performed at IIASA systemati-
cally analyzed how international environmental institutions respond
to poor implementation and noncompliance.65  It examined how insti-
tutions performed four functions: (1) obtaining information on the
implementation of existing commitments; (2) reviewing that informa-
tion to assess the extent of implementation efforts; (3) responding to
cases of inadequate implementation; and (4) reviewing the adequacy
of existing commitments.66 The IIASA team examined these functions
together, as a system, because they expected (and found) that the
functions would be closely linked.  Information used to assess imple-
mentation, for example, could also be used to probe the adequacy of
existing commitments to meet certain collective goals.
The system approach also revealed something more surprising:
much more monitoring and enforcement of obligations occurs than is
evident from reading treaty texts and observing the dismal history of
efforts to use self-reporting and other procedural requirements to re-
view implementation.67  While the community of legal scholars, espe-
cially in Europe, tends to focus on treaty texts and formal obligations
and procedures, only a system perspective really explains how moni-
toring and enforcement occur.  The IIASA team found that much of
the system is, in fact, external to the legal regime;68 these studies sug-
gest that not only is that factually true, it is probably also more effec-
tive than if the procedures were formalized.69  A look at treaty texts is
depressing for those who want the serious attention to implementa-
tion that is needed to solve environmental problems; a closer look re-
veals, in every case, an active and vibrant system for implementation
review (SIR).70  Moreover, the informal procedures were dispropor-
tionately responsible for applying the tough enforcement measures
that Downs et al. predicted would be necessary for cooperation.71  In
every case examined, if cooperation went beyond simple coordination
64. See Downs et al., Good News?, supra note 2, at 380.
65. See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS, supra note 4, at Part I.
66. See Systems for Implementation Review, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COMMITMENTS, supra note 4, at 47, 48.
67. See id. at 50-53.
68. See id. at 50; see also Raustiala & Victor, supra note 7, at 661-63.
69. See Raustiala & Victor, supra note 7, at 685 (“Conventional wisdom holds that the
most effective international commitments are legally binding.  Yet our cases point to many in-
stances where non-binding agreements have had greater influence on behavior . . . .”).
70. See id. at 694-95.
71. See id. (describing how informal procedures do the heavy lifting); see also Downs et al.,
Good News?, supra note 2, at 380.
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and harmony, then tougher “enforcement” elements of a SIR also
emerged.72  Often these were not used against liberal states—whose
own internal pressure was strong—but they proved vital when dealing
with the poor implementation and noncompliance of illiberal na-
tions.73
The best example is the Montreal Protocol, which is rare among
multilateral environmental agreements in that it has a mechanism—
the Non-Compliance Procedure—to handle cases of poor implementa-
tion.74  Most multilateral environmental agreements have provisions
for dispute resolution which have never been used in practice.75  Yet,
even in the case of the Montreal Protocol—where formal procedures
are most likely to play a major role—the ability of the institution to
deter and reverse noncompliance has depended upon a blend of for-
mal and informal powers.  Early in the Non-Compliance Procedure’s
existence, the Implementation Committee (IC)—a standing commit-
tee that manages the Procedure—sought to identify which countries
were not reporting the data that each party  to the Protocol is obliged
to supply.76  That task was easy, but efforts to improve reporting by
cajoling, pressuring, and discussing data reporting with the delinquent
parties—in essence, the managerial approach advocated by Chayes
and Chayes77—were effective only when parties found it easy to com-
ply.78  In tougher cases, data were supplied only when the IC could
link performance to other benefits of the Protocol—in extreme cases,
expulsion from the Protocol’s Multilateral Fund (MLF) that compen-
sates developing countries for the cost of complying with the Proto-
col.79  In other instances, the IC has been effective only when it was
able to link performance to sticks, not just the withdrawal of existing
carrots.80  As noted earlier, sanctions can be applied against countries
that are not parties to the Protocol—but those countries can escape
72. See Raustiala & Victor, supra note 7, at 694-95.
73. See id. at 693.
74. See Owen Greene, The System for Implementation Review in the Ozone Regime, in
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS, supra note 4, at 89, 91; Victor, Operation
and Effectiveness, supra note 12, at 137.
75. See PATRICA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 180 (1992).
76. See Victor, Operation and Effectiveness, supra note 12, at 143.
77. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 22-28.
78. For a comparison of the management and enforcement approaches, see Victor, Opera-
tion and Effectiveness, supra note 12, at 149; David G. Victor et al., Introduction and Overview,
in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS, supra note 4, at 1, 19.
79. See Victor, Operation and Effectiveness, supra note 12, at 152.
80. See id. at 153.
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sanctions if they demonstrate that their national actions are in com-
pliance with the Protocol.81  The IC did case-by-case evaluations to
put that provision of the Protocol into practice;82 its judgments were
extremely influential because they were backed by the credible threat
of sanctions.  As Downs et al. predicted, strong incentives, including
sanctions and other instruments of enforcement, are needed when
deep cooperation creates strong incentives to defect.
The above are examples of situations where the IC’s actions have
been influential because of links to other aspects of the Montreal Pro-
tocol regime.  But in its most difficult case to date, the noncompliance
by Russia and other former centrally planned states, the key linkages
were formally external to the Montreal Protocol.  The Soviet Union
had negotiated a special provision in the original Montreal Protocol
to make it easier to comply,83 but at that time (1987) it did not antici-
pate the collapse and dismemberment of the Union that would leave
the central government unable to command the resources and control
over private firms that would be needed to comply with the Proto-
col.84  As Chayes and Chayes anticipated, a change in circumstances,
rather than an intention from the beginning, led to noncompliance.85
But, as Downs et al. have argued, strict enforcement measures have
been a necessary part of the solution.86
By late 1994, it was clear that Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine
would not comply with the January 1, 1996, deadline for fully phas-
ing-out the most noxious ozone-depleting substances.87  Bulgaria and
Poland also feared noncompliance but were in a different situation
and have managed to comply.88  Some countries supplied data that
clearly showed noncompliance was imminent; a group of experts
found the same after convening to examine the special problems as-
sociated with compliance by these “countries in economic transition
(CIETs).”89  Russia, the largest producer of ozone-depleting sub-
stances in the region, did not itself supply any data and resisted dip-
lomatic pressure and other managerial techniques that attempted to
81. See id. at 144.
82. See id.
83. See BENEDICK, supra note 24, at 276-85.
84. See id. at 276-78.
85. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 10, 15.
86. See Downs et al., Good News?, supra note 2, at 397-99.
87. See Victor, Operation and Effectiveness, supra note 12, at 155-56.
88. See id.
89. See Greene, supra note 74, at 111; Victor, Operation and Effectiveness, supra note 12, at
147-48.
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extract even estimated data from the Russian republic.90  Other for-
mer Soviet republics also had problems supplying data because the
historical archives from which they might derive estimated consump-
tion were held by Moscow.91  Unable to assure that a major producer
(Russia) and significant consumers (Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine)
would comply, a train wreck for the Montreal Protocol was on the ho-
rizon.
Because these transition countries were not “developing coun-
tries,” they were not eligible for MLF assistance to defray the costs of
compliance.92  In fact, all were expected to pay into the MLF, al-
though none did.93  Into this void stepped the Global Environment
Facility (GEF) with an offer to pay much of the cost of compliance.94
The GEF made its resources conditional upon proper handling of
these cases through the Non-Compliance Procedure and thus em-
powered the IC to act as its agent in reviewing compliance plans and
tracking progress.95  Only with this power in hand was the IC able to
induce Russia to supply the required data on its (non)compliance
and, eventually, to submit a verifiable plan for bringing its behavior
into compliance.96  The IC was further empowered by a non-official
threat from Western nations to sanction Russia and other countries if
they undermined the Montreal Protocol.97  Still, GEF is paying only
part of the cost of compliance.98  Although the West might not have
compelled Russia to change its behavior without the incentive of
GEF funding, even with such compensation it has been far from cos-
tless for Russia to comply with the Protocol.99
Looking at the legal texts—the Montreal Protocol and the formal
Decisions of the Protocol’s supreme decision-making body (the
Meeting of the Parties) that created the Non-Compliance Procedure
and the IC—nowhere in evidence are the links to the MLF and GEF
90. See Victor, Operation and Effectiveness, supra note 12, at 155-57.
91. See id.
92. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 5.  For further detail on eligibility, see Vic-
tor, Operation and Effectiveness, supra note 12, at 171 n.27.
93. See Victor, Operation and Effectiveness, supra note 12, at 147, 148.
94. See id. at 149-50; Greene, supra note 74, at 116.
95. See Victor, Operation and Effectiveness, supra note 12, at 164.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 150.
98. See id. at 160.
99. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 74, at 114-18; Victor, Operation and Effectiveness, supra
note 12, at 160; VICTOR, EARLY OPERATION, supra note 3, at ¶ 4.
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that have, in practice, made the Procedure and IC effective.100  A link
to the MLF is now codified in one Decision, which was created as the
participants in the system for implementation review learned what
types of links between MLF funding and country performance might
be useful and were politically feasible to adopt.101  Inside the Montreal
Protocol system no link between the Procedure and the GEF was
formalized until after it de facto existed.102  When the Procedure was
designed, some countries had attempted to create specific links be-
tween compliance with the Protocol and specific penalties and re-
wards that might be marshaled by the Non-Compliance Procedure.103
But they were rebuffed by others who feared the creation of a strong
enforcement mechanism in the Non-Compliance Procedure.104  Since
significant decisions under international law require nearly unani-
mous consent, only a weaker procedure was adopted.105  The Russia
case shows that a procedure with only the managerial tools at its dis-
posal will not influence behavior when compliance is highly incon-
venient.  Rather, a solution to the problem of CIET noncompliance is
being worked out through a mixture of the Chayes and Chayes mana-
gerial strategy and the Downs et al. enforcement approach.106
In sum, the SIR in the Montreal Protocol is a combination of
formal, dedicated procedures and ad hoc, informal ones.  It is focused
on the IC and the Non-Compliance Procedure, but in difficult cases
these formally established means of handling noncompliance have
been effective only because they were linked to other mechanisms for
delivering rewards and sanctions.  The IC and the Procedure pro-
vided an institutional context, but the SIR would have had little influ-
ence on behavior in the cases that matter most if it had been re-
stricted only to these formal institutions and powers.  Today, more
countries are reporting data, more non-parties are complying with the
Protocol, and even the former centrally planned countries are in bet-
100. See Victor, Operation and Effectiveness, supra note 12, at 159; Victor et al., supra note
78, at 18.
101. See Victor, Operation and Effectiveness, supra note 12, at 145-46 (describing Decision
VI/5).
102. See id. at 149.
103. See id. at 140-42.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 138-39.
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ter shape for future compliance than they would be without the Pro-
tocol’s SIR.107
The Montreal Protocol’s SIR is one example of many such sys-
tems.  Other studies have shown how SIRs have emerged and operate
in international regimes to regulate pollution in the Baltic Sea,108 pro-
tect wildlife,109 and regulate trade in hazardous chemicals and pesti-
cides.110  Studies have also examined the uses of data in SIRs and
long-term trends in how SIRs have been codified into international
law.111  Overall, the concept of a SIR is both a normative argument
and an accurate description of how international institutions assess
implementation and handle implementation failures.  Compared with
fully formalized approaches, SIRs appear to be a robust means of ad-
dressing the perennial problem of enforcement of international law.
The effectiveness of SIRs is in part due to their informal and decen-
tralized attributes, which help to fill part of the need for monitoring
and enforcement.112  They are effective, but jerry-rigged, and some at-
tributes of SIRs pose problems for international cooperation.
One problem is that SIRs depend on synergies with existing insti-
tutions that are not formally charged with servicing international
agreements.  While that can be efficient and effective, it also creates
an institutional system whose actions are driven by external interests.
For example, many observers have argued that oversight by public in-
terest NGOs is vital to international environmental cooperation, but
the IIASA research found that often public interest groups have not
performed that function because they have had few incentives to
build up the capacity to do so.113  Membership organizations must ap-
peal to their membership, which often responds to visible results.
Thus, enforcement actions have been plentiful when whaling ships
and clandestine toxic trade by multinational corporations are the tar-
107. For more information, see United Nations Environmental Programme, Reports (visited
Feb. 1, 2000) <http://www.unep.org/ozone/reports2.htm>.
108. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 74.
109. See, e.g., John Lanchbery, Long-term Trends in Systems for Implementation Review in
International Agreements on Flora and Fauna, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COMMITMENTS, supra note 4, at 57.
110. See, e.g., David G. Victor, “Learning by Doing” in the Nonbinding International Regime
to Manage Trade in Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COMMITMENTS, supra note 4, at 221.
111. See, e.g., Juan Carlos di Primio, Data Quality and Compliance Control in the European
Air Pollution Regime, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS, supra note 4, at
283; Lanchbery, supra note 109, at 60.
112. See Raustiala & Victor, supra note 7, at 677.
113. See id. at 667.
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gets, but not so abundant when they concern less tangible, often
chronic implementation failures.114  Moreover, the line between politi-
cal action and enforcing the rule of law is blurry or nonexistent when
legal institutions rely on outsiders to monitor and enforce compliance.
Boycotts against whaling nations organized by public interest groups,
and threats of sanctions issued by the U.S., have been abundant even
when there has been no formal situation of noncompliance.115  Rather,
such unilateral threats are attempts to make wildlife regulation more
effective, which is not the same as objectively enforcing international
laws on the books.
In principal, scientific institutions could provide some functions
of implementation review in many areas of international environ-
mental cooperation.  Often, the task of assessing the adequacy of
commitments draws upon the data collection and analytical capacity
built up in the scientific community.116  Yet in this respect also, exter-
nal actors will not automatically provide even-handed monitoring and
enforcement of international obligations.  The task of regular moni-
toring of national behavior is boring and expensive and unlikely to at-
tract scarce scientific funding and talent.  Only rarely does the task of
verifying national emissions inventories, for example, yield scientific
advance.  Despite the huge public interest in stratospheric ozone de-
pletion, only one scientific group has attempted to assess the veracity
of data reported on the consumption of chlorofluorocarbons, and
then only on a regional basis (which is of little use to the Montreal
Protocol, for which compliance is determined on a country-by-
country basis).117
An oft-cited example of science in the service of international
environmental governance is use of the “critical load” concept in the
1994 “second sulfur protocol” that limits acid rain in Europe.118  The
first sulfur protocol, discussed earlier, merely set across-the-board
targets with little attention to ecological or economic effects.119  In the
second protocol, scientific models were used to focus negotiations on
strengthening sulfur regulations in a way that would be environmen-
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 680; Victor et al., supra note 78, at 18.
117. See Dona Hartley & Ronald Prinn, Feasibility of Determining Surface Emissions of
Trace Gases Using an Inverse Method in a Three-Dimensional Chemical Transport Model, 98 J.
GEOPHYSICAL RES. 5183, 5183 (1993).
118. See 1994 Sulfur Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 1.
119. See 1985 Sulfur Protocol, supra note 17; Levy, International Co-operation, supra note
17, at 60; Levy, European Acid Rain, supra note 18, at 91-94.
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tally most effective—that is, by focusing emission controls on the
sources that led to the greatest pollution above the level that ecosys-
tems could tolerate (i.e., above the “critical load”).120  However, this
example is not an illustration of science autonomously providing this
capacity.  Rather, the investments that made the critical load concept
viable for policy were the result of a conscious strategic decision by
regulators.  Over nearly two decades, transport matrices and atmos-
pheric monitoring networks were built up in Europe (and funded
since 1984 by a special protocol to the Framework Convention on
European transboundary air pollution).121  Without those matrices
and data, and models built on them, the novel critical load concept
could not have been implemented.122  Building the scientific capacity
that is needed for broad-based and comprehensive SIRs takes dec-
ades of sustained investment; the European acid rain regime is one of
the few examples.
Another problematic aspect of SIRs is that they operate princi-
pally in ‘fire alarm’ mode.  As suggested above, the alarm sounds
when violations correspond with the interests of external actors,
which may not always coincide with the common interest in even-
handed regulation.  In addition to that worry, theoretical studies of
optimal monitoring and enforcement strategies suggest that some
regular monitoring and enforcement is needed even when most en-
forcement activity is mobilized for problem cases.123  Thus, while the
decentralized and ad hoc approach to SIRs may be politically expedi-
ent, especially for the sensitive tasks related to enforcement of com-
mitments, in nearly every case proper monitoring and enforcement
probably requires a substantial formal and dedicated institutionalized
capacity.
IV.  APPLICATION TO GLOBAL WARMING
The story of international environmental cooperation is not en-
couraging for the current effort to tackle global warming.  It would be
easy to generate global warming agreements with modest commit-
ments that yield high levels of compliance—indeed, there is one: the
Climate Change Convention.  But conventional wisdom is that mod-
est commitments will not get the job done—deep cuts in emissions
120. See Levy, International Co-operation, supra note 17, at 61.
121. See Levy, European Acid Rain, supra note 18, at 88.
122. See di Primio, supra note 111, at 288.
123. See CLIFFORD S. RUSSELL ET AL., ENFORCING POLLUTION CONTROL LAW 220-23
(1986).
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will be needed to slow global warming, and they could be costly.124  It
would be possible to restrict demanding cooperation to the liberal
states where concern about global warming and the capacity to en-
force obligations are high, but an agreement that is restricted to the
OECD nations would be meaningless.  Significant levels of emissions
are from the non-liberal world (the former Soviet Union and devel-
oping nations),125 and globalization makes all nations quite sensitive
about differential obligations.  No doubt cuts in the emissions from
industrialized nations must be earlier and more costly than in the rest
of the world, but a regime that is focused on the emissions from the
liberal world is unlikely to survive politically.126  A compensation
scheme could entice others to participate, but significant cuts in emis-
sions will be costly.  Unless the advanced industrialized countries are
convinced that the costs of climate change will be severe and un-
avoidable, it is unlikely that they would be willing to pay for a scheme
to compensate the full incremental cost (as in the Montreal Protocol’s
MLF).  To date, the Montreal Protocol’s MLF has required about $1
billion in contributions and is on track to eliminate the problem of
ozone depletion.  A climate fund could require tens or hundreds of
billions of dollars only to slow the rate of warming.  Yet, if reluctant
participants do not receive the full incremental cost of changing their
behavior, they will have an incentive to defect.  Even liberal states
will face incentives to defect if costs are high and their commitment to
action varies—as surely it will over the many decades of sustained ac-
tion that would be needed to make a dent in the global warming
problem.127  Maintaining cooperation will require an enforcement
mechanism.  Yet, experience with shallow commitments and coopera-
tion restricted among the liberal nations—in which compliance has
been achieved without much enforcement, and SIRs have filled the
few enforcement gaps that do exist—says little about how to ensure
124. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995:
THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 25-26 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 1996) (providing an ex-
planation of the need for deep cuts—perhaps more than 50 percent below current levels for
some gases—to stabilize concentration levels) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 1995].  For more
on issues that determine the cost of achieving such stabilization, see also T.M.L Wigley et al.,
Economic and Environmental Choices in the Stabilization of Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations,
379 NATURE 240, 241 (1996).
125. See GLOBAL ENERGY PERSPECTIVES 140 (Nebojsa Nakicenovic et al. eds., 1998).
126. See David G. Victor, After Kyoto 2-3 (Sept. 15, 1999) (unpublished mimeograph, on
file with author) [hereinafter Victor, After Kyoto].
127. The long time frame is dictated by the long atmospheric lifetime of the main anthrop o-
genic greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide.  For more on the science, see CLIMATE CHANGE 1995,
supra note 124, at 25-26.
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that nations keep commitments when there are strong incentives to
defect.
At least two routes appear to lead out of this morass.  One, an in-
ternational emission trading system, is today’s anointed choice;128 but
in reality, it is only a path to a fantasyland and will not work.  The
other, government policies that focus on technological innovation,
appears to be inefficient or even crazy but is worth a closer look, cer-
tainly given the dearth of acceptable alternatives.  The former is often
touted as a model case where market forces could be harnessed to
lower the cost of abatement;129 the latter is seen as inappropriate gov-
ernment intervention into free markets.130  But in the practical world,
exactly the opposite could be true: international emission trading may
be a theoretical ideal that is not ready for the real challenge of global
warming, and the technology policy could be an effective second-best
solution to the problem of global warming.
A.  International Emission Trading
Emission trading offers what appears to be an elegant solution to
the enforcement problem.  The idea is to allocate property rights in
the form of emission allowances, track their origin, and make buyers
of these permits liable for noncompliance.131  Thus, if Russia sells one
ton of permits to an American firm, that firm is able to use the full
value of the permits only if Russia complies with its global warming
treaty obligations.  The predictable result is elegant and powerful: the
market will price the risk of noncompliance, and sellers will have an
incentive to stay in line.  Because the largest markets of buyers will be
in the liberal world, at least for the next few decades, strong national
legal institutions in those nations can enforce compliance.132  Thus,
emission trading could solve one of the thorniest problems of interna-
tional cooperation: enforcement.
This would be a persuasive approach if it were realistic to im-
plement.  But trading is hobbled by other problems that probably
128. See Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, art. 6, 37 I.L.M. 22, 35 (not yet in force) (84 signato-
ries and 22 Parties as of Jan. 20, 2000) (envisioning a trading system), available at <http://www.
unfccc.de/resource/docs/cop3/l07a01.htm>.
129. See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice
in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 763-71 (1999).
130. See Jeffrey S. Banks et al., The Politics of Commercial R&D Programs, in THE
TECHNOLOGY PORK BARREL 53, 54 (Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll eds., 1991).
131. See Victor, After Kyoto, supra note 126, at 2.
132. See id. at 3.
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make it infeasible.  The author has reviewed these problems in detail
elsewhere,133 but in brief they amount to the following:
• Allocation of permits.  The Kyoto Protocol sets emission tar-
gets and allows emission trading,134 and thus potentially allo-
cates emission permits that are worth perhaps $2.3 trillion.135
As countries discover what is at stake the deal will unravel; al-
ready the intense gaming over rules for emission trading can be
viewed as an effort to adjust the allocation.136  And, of course,
the allocation will be scrutinized closely as legislatures decide
whether to ratify the deal.  In the West, especially the United
States, it will not go unnoticed that the Kyoto targets allocate
probably about a $100 billion windfall to Russia and
Ukraine.137  That windfall—and its political liabilities—is but
133. See id. at 1.
134. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 128, at arts. 3, 6.  The first emission targets strive for
reductions below 1990 levels within the budget period of 2008-2012.
135. Based on trades at $50 per ton of carbon, with the asset value calculated using a yield of
8%.  That is, this calculation assumes allocation into perpetuity.  In reality, the assets will not be
perfectly permanent and thus the effective yield will be higher and the assets will be less valu-
able. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory
and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 379 (1989).  However, assuming that the assets are perma-
nent is a useful starting point for discussing the value of the assets, because budget periods sub-
sequent to 2008-2012 will, in practice, almost certainly use the 2008-2012 allocation as a starting
point for adjustment. Cf., e.g., Annie Petsonk, The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Integrating
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowance Trading into the Global Marketplace, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y F. 185, 207 (1999) (explaining “allocation on the basis of historic emissions levels” and
using 2008-2012 as the base-years).  The $2.3 trillion figure includes only carbon dioxide from
fossil fuels; add perhaps one-quarter or one-half of that value to account for the other green-
house gases.
136. As more countries realize the stakes, they realize their interest in particular rules.  Al-
ready four East European countries have secured rules that allow them to use base-years prior
to 1990 when their emissions were higher; those nonstandard base-years, in effect, increase
those nations’ permit allocations by about 14% ($20 billion by the calculation in note 135). See
also Victor, After Kyoto, supra note 126, at 8.  For works pointing out that rent-seeking behav-
ior is often associated with property rights allocation when the stakes are high enough, see, e.g.,
Daniel H. Cole, Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about Property Rights and Environmental
Protection, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 103, 122 & n.94 (1999); Terry L. Anderson & J.
Bishop Grewell, Property Rights Solutions for the Global Commons: Bottom-Up or Top-Down?,
10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 73, 93-94 (1999) (“The process of assigning property rights has
definite distributional consequences because property rights represent claims on rents.  There-
fore, political creation of property rights attracts rent-seeking efforts to influence their distribu-
tion that can be costly in themselves.”).
137. That calculation is based on the revenue flow for five years, not the sale of a permanent
asset.  No doubt this “hot air” will be stripped away in the next budget period, and thus it would
be wrong to assume that it is a permanent asset for Russia and Ukraine.  (The calculation in
note 135 is based on the assumption that the asset allocation is permanent; hence, the value of
the underlying assets is calculated by dividing the annual stream of revenues by the interest rate.
Here, the value is simply the five-year stream of payments from the extra permits.) See Kyoto
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one illustration of the general problem of allocating property
rights under conditions of extreme uncertainty.
• Adjustment and expansion.  What is known about global
warming is that we do not know the proper level of control;138
moreover, in the near future, regulation must expand to in-
clude the developing countries, from which the absolute levels
of emissions will outstrip those of the industrialized world in
the next few decades.139  Without the developing world, a de-
clining fraction of greenhouse gas emissions will be under con-
trol and the “global” regulatory regime will be increasingly
meaningless and ineffective.140  Thus, the emission trading sys-
tem also must expand.  However, adjustment, and especially
expansion, will be difficult because property rights create in-
terests that will be well organized against changes in the alloca-
tion.  The long history of highly contested—often failed—ef-
forts to adopt policies that reduce land values—“takings”—
should give pause to those who want to create new property
rights in a system where it is known with certainty that those
rights must be reallocated.141  Indeed, as the trading system
expands the developing nations will seek windfalls similar to
allocations awarded to Russia and Ukraine in Kyoto.  But
remaining faithful to the objective of slowing global warming,
which requires offsetting every new permit issued by retiring
another, creates a zero-sum negotiation.  Who will pay (in the
form of accepting fewer permits) for the extra permits that will
be needed to entice these new players into the regime?
• Transaction costs. The system as envisioned in the Kyoto Pro-
tocol covers not just CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion
Protocol, supra note 128, at app. B (identifying the Russian and Ukrainian allocation); DAVID
G. VICTOR ET AL., THE KYOTO PROTOCOL CARBON BUBBLE: IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIA,
UKRAINE AND EMISSION TRADING 8  (Int’l Inst. for Applied Sys. Analysis Interim Report IR-
98-094, 1998) (providing the allocation value for Russia and Ukraine).
138. Article 2 of the Climate Change Convention, supra note 3, states that its “ultimate ob-
jective” is “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” GLOBAL
ENERGY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 125, at 139.  However, it does not define what is “danger-
ous,” and various efforts to do so have not produced any unambiguous results.
139. See GLOBAL ENERGY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 125, at 244.
140. See id. at 140, 244.
141. Even if the legal problems of “takings” in an emission trading program can be solved—
as they were in the 1990 Clean Air Act, which issued “allowances” to emit sulfur dioxide rather
than durable property rights—the political problem remains.  Owners of an existing asset know
what they stand to lose from reallocation and will organize against it.
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(which are easy to monitor accurately) but also five other
gases.142  By far the most important of those other gases is
methane, but anthropogenic methane emissions are very diffi-
cult to monitor accurately at the level of resolution (country-
and firm-level) that is needed for an emission permit system.143
That problem can be solved easily by restricting the trading
system to fossil fuel CO2 (although that would require
renegotiating the Kyoto Protocol).  Another transaction cost
problem—enforcement—is not so easy to solve.  Although
emissions trading with buyer liability can be largely self-
enforcing, it still requires strong institutions to ensure that the
emission rights are secure and that buyers remain liable.144  It
helps that most buyers, at least initially, will be in liberal na-
tions where legal institutions are strong and perhaps can play
much of the needed enforcement role.145  There will still be a
need for public international institutions; yet, the international
community has no experience with the types of efficient insti-
tutions that are most likely required.  The WTO dispute panel
system is one model that has been effective in handling major
disputes.146  However, the system is costly and cumbersome—
poorly suited to the kind of quick and decisive action that is
142. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 128, at app. A.
143. See Victor, After Kyoto, supra note 126, at 24-25. Of course, similar problems arise
with other regulatory instruments; however, coordinated policies to control methane—rather
than instruments such as trading, which require highly quantified emission estimates—are less
demanding of accurate data on emissions and thus probably have much lower transactions costs.
144. See id. at 28-37.
145. Although emissions from developing countries are rising rapidly, most greenhouse gas
emissions are from industrialized nations—in essence, the members of the OECD (liberal na-
tions) and the former Soviet Union (non-liberal nations).  Moreover, the Kyoto Protocol does
not regulate emissions from developing countries (mostly non-liberal), so all the buying of emis-
sion permits will occur by the industrialized nations.  As argued earlier, the Kyoto Protocol in-
cludes generous targets for Russia and Ukraine—indeed, those nations probably would not
have joined the Protocol if the it had required them to undertake any costly actions.  Russia and
Ukraine will thus be net sellers of permits, and all the net buying will be by the advanced indus-
trialized (liberal) nations of the OECD.
146. For an update on the disputes being handled in the WTO system, see World Trade Or-
ganization, Dispute Settlement: List of Panel and Appellate Body Reports (visited May 1, 2000)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distab_e.htm>.  Assessing the effectiveness of
the dispute system is difficult, but some indicators suggest that it is quite effective.  First, the
number of disputes since the system began (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995) has been large com-
pared with the number of disputes handled under the previous GATT panel system.  The large
number is one indication that members are willing to undergo the cost of a WTO dispute.  Sec-
ond, nearly all disputes are resolved according to the rule of law.  While today there are some
lingering cases of noncompliance even after a dispute has been handled—notably, at this writing
the European ban on meat hormones, which the WTO’s Appellate Body has ruled is inconsis-
tent with the WTO’s Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures—those are the excep-
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oorly suited to the kind of quick and decisive action that is
needed to preserve an efficient market, especially when minor
violations are detected.  Failure to establish credible institu-
tions could cause the emission trading system to unravel
quickly; with trillions of dollars at stake and the cost of compli-
ance extremely clear to permit-buyers, no country will stay in-
side the system for long if it senses that others are skirting
compliance.  Yet, having already capitalized their permits, no
large permit-holder will want to discard the system before
cashing out.  The result, it seems, would be an odd mix of dis-
satisfaction, paralysis, and high stakes desperation for defec-
tion.
• Fundamental incompatibility with the global warming problem.
Finally, there is a “prices vs. quantities” problem.147  Global
warming is caused mainly by the stock of long-lived CO2 that
accumulates slowly in the atmosphere.148  Thus, the benefits of
abatement, although uncertain, rise slowly over time.  The
costs of abatement are also uncertain, but they could rise
quickly if emission limits are set over too short a time period.
Forcing a modern economy to meet strict emission limits on a
timetable that is more rapid than the turnover of the capital
stock can require premature retirement of some stock (e.g.,
power plants); this is very costly considering its small impact
tions rather than the rule.  Third, many other issues have been resolved before going to a formal
dispute panel because the parties know that the panels will uphold WTO rules.
147. For a detailed analysis of the “prices vs. quantities” problem, see Martin L. Weitzman,
Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974).
148. See WILLIAM PIZER, CHOOSING PRICE OR QUANTITY CONTROLS FOR GREENHOUSE
GASES 7 (Resources for the Future Climate Issues Brief No. 17, 1999) available at
<http://www.rff.org/issue_briefs/PDF_files/ccbrf17.pdf>:
[C]limate change consequences generally depend on the stock of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere, rather than annual emissions.  Greenhouse gases emitted today re-
main in the atmosphere for hundreds of years.  It is not the level of annual emissions
that matters for climate change, but rather the total amount of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases that have accumulated in the atmosphere.
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is removed from the atmosphere by many processes, and thus
CO2 has many atmospheric lifetimes.  A small fraction of CO2 is removed quickly, but the proc-
esses that dominate the removal of CO2 from the atmosphere occur over several decades, centu-
ries, and millennia.  Thus, high rates of emission of CO2 into the atmosphere result in CO2 build-
up, with complete removal only over a long time scale. See also CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra
note 127, at 14-17 (providing additional information on the carbon cycle).  For a recent study
suggesting that the efficiency of removal of CO2 might deteriorate substantially, which would
increase the rate at which the atmospheric stock builds up, see James F. Kasting, The Carbon
Cycle, Climate, and the Long-term Effects of Fossil Fuel Burning, 4 CONSEQUENCES (last modi-
fied Feb. 17, 1999) <http://gcrio.org/CONSEQUENCES/vol4no1/carbcycle.html>.
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on the long-term problem of carbon accumulation.  In these
situations, a price instrument (e.g., a carbon tax) is much pre-
ferred to restricting quantities (e.g., emission targets and time-
tables, or emission trading).149  The importance of that logic
will grow as the effort to wean the economy from carbon in-
tensifies.  And if that is true then perhaps it is best to get
started with price instruments (emission taxes) rather than re-
stricting quantities (tradable permits).
These are serious problems.  The allocation problems seem so
difficult to settle that they virtually assure that emission trading will
not work.  There is some hope that allocation will make permits eas-
ier to implement when compared with other systems because permits
can be used to compensate reluctant participants.150  But once the par-
ties look seriously at allocation, they are likely to realize it is a zero-
sum game.  Such games are especially challenging when they allocate
de facto assets (not just revenue flows) and when the interests of the
main protagonists (the industrialized and developing countries) do
not coincide.151  These problems are compounded by uncertainty and
the fear of being hoodwinked.  The future level of emissions from a
country cannot be known; it is the same for the future value of per-
mits.  Aversion to risk will lead each country to overstate its future
needs, with the result that negotiations over how to expand the per-
mit system might actually have negative sum characteristics.152
B.  Alternatives
Of course, emission trading is not the only instrument available
for slowing global warming.  But most of the alternatives have prob-
lems of similar difficulty.  A system for coordinating carbon taxes, for
example, faces severe enforcement problems: unlike trading, the
market in a carbon tax system does not automatically price the risk of
noncompliance and thus the need for strong international institutions
149. See PIZER, supra note 148, at 7-8:
Even for those who believe the consequences of global warming will be dire and that
current emission targets are not aggressive enough, price policies are still better.  An
aggressive policy designed to eventually stabilize the stock does not demand a strict
limit on emissions before stabilization becomes necessary.  Additional emissions this
year are no worse than emissions next year.  Why not abate more when costs are low
and less when costs are high—exactly the outcome under a price mechanism?
150. See Wiener, supra note 129, at 763-66.
151. On the problem of divergent interests, see Richard N. Cooper, Toward a Real Global
Warming Treaty, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 66; Thomas C. Schelling, The Cost of Com-
bating Global Warming: Facing the Tradeoffs, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 8.
152. See Victor, After Kyoto, supra note 126, at 8.
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is perhaps even greater than in a system of emission trading backed
by buyer liability.  A system for coordinating policies and measures,
such as that proposed by the European Union, faces serious chal-
lenges of monitoring and enforcement since “policies and measures”
must be defined, their effects must be estimated, and there have been
no serious attempts to do so.  Overcoming these hurdles is possible,
but it will probably take a long time and will require greater willing-
ness to vest powers in international institutions.
Thus, the prospects for cooperation on global warming seem to
be bleak.  Cooperation restricted to liberal nations will be too con-
strained because warming is a global problem with global sources.
Cooperation on a global scale will be too difficult because efforts to
build powerful international environmental institutions have been
least effective when they involve the largest number of countries.153
There is one aspect of the international response to global
warming for which cooperation limited to industrialized countries
could have a worldwide effect: technology.  All of the major centers
of innovation in energy technologies are in the industrialized world.
Nearly all spending on basic research and development—and at least
85% of the scientific output—is from the advanced industrialized na-
tions.  Of those, a few—notably the United States, Germany, Japan,
the United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, Sweden, and France—
dominate energy-related innovation.  The nations that have the
greatest concern about global warming—and the highest willingness
to pay for action—happen to be those where the technical solutions
are most likely to emerge.  In an ideal world, those nations would
attempt to create a market-based approach that includes all nations—
such as emission trading or a harmonized system of emission taxes.
Politically, however, the experience with the Kyoto Protocol is
proving that difficult.  What if, instead, these countries could focus on
innovation itself?154
153. See George W. Downs et al., Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism, 52 INT’L ORG.
397, 398-99 (1998).
154. If one relies on the price mechanism (e.g., taxes or price incentives through the re-
quirement to hold emission permits), then the response to the price is a combination of substit u-
tion and innovation—that is, changes along the production frontier and efforts to shift the fron-
tier outward.  Especially over the short run (decadal), it appears that the substitution effects are
more important, and over the long run the most important effect is innovation.  Since a pure
price approach brings both factors into play, the need for broad participation in the regime is
especially high—the effects on competitiveness are felt quickly.  The hypothesis in this article—
and in the author’s research at the Council on Foreign Relations on technology policy—is that a
strategy focused on innovation is an easier first move than determining prices and quantities.
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In practice, if these nations collectively pursued a technology
strategy, each would probably undertake a different blend of meas-
ures.  However, the actions probably would have many common ele-
ments: incentives for energy-related basic research, lowering of mar-
ket barriers for new efficient products, and programs to aid pre-
commercial investment in novel technologies.  Already there is some
consensus on the need for incentives to increase upstream invest-
ment—without government intervention, society would under-invest
in basic research and other activities that create public goods (e.g.,
knowledge).155  With deregulation of energy markets, basic energy-
related research is already in alarming decline in many industrialized
countries and action is needed to halt this under-investment.156
Downstream policies, such as public-private partnerships for devel-
opment and demonstration of technologies, are more controversial
because there is a greater risk that government policy will be based
on inadequate information and thus interfere with the operation of
the market.157  But much has been learned about how to design down-
stream policies that, if applied, could yield both an effective and po-
litically feasible technology strategy: examples include (1) broad in-
vestment portfolios, especially upstream, rather than prematurely
“picking winners;” (2) independent expert review of investments; and
(3) sunset provisions to ensure that government exits as technologies
reach truly commercial markets.  The lessons generally are not ap-
plied because legislators have given remarkably little attention to
technology-related policies as a core element of environmental pro-
tection.  Rather, technology has been viewed either as a “field of
dreams”—a miracle of innovation that follows from stringent envi-
ronmental targets (require it, and it will be developed)—or as another
source of pork.  A technology strategy, like any other public policy,
will require a concerted political effort to take implementation seri-
ously.  And it does not make economic or political sense to focus ac-
tions entirely on technology.  A tax on emissions of greenhouse gases
155. For more on public goods, see GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999).  For evidence that invest-
ment in the public good of energy-related knowledge is already too low, see J.J. Dooley, Unin-
tended Consequences: Energy R&D in a Deregulated Energy Market, 26 ENERGY POL’Y 547, 547
(1998).
156. For more on the decline in energy-related basic research, see Dooley, supra note 155, at
548; M. Granger Morgan & Susan F. Tierney, Research Support for the Power Industry, 15
ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 81, 85-87 (1998).
157. See Banks et al., supra note 130, at 69-70.
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would also be necessary to provide an additional incentive for the ap-
plication of new technologies in the field.
A technology strategy could ease the problem of international
cooperation because, initially, it requires significantly fewer nations to
participate.  However, some formal collective action would be needed
because no nation would implement the strategy fully on its own.
However, the style of international cooperation would be very differ-
ent from the framework established in the 1992 United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change158 or the 1997 Kyoto Pro-
tocol.159  The precise effects of national technology strategies would be
difficult to measure.  Rather than target quantities of emissions, the
system may better resemble the Marshall Plan or the WTO system.
Negotiations over the collective effort would evolve through a system
of proposals and counter-proposals for the packages of measures that
each nation would implement.  Internal to each proposal would be
benchmarks for assessing progress.  After agreement is forged, mu-
tual scrutiny and negotiation would continue through periodic re-
views analyzing which measures are working and whether each nation
is doing its part of the collective effort.
A concerted effort in these nations to support development and
demonstration of new technologies would make it possible for those
new technologies to diffuse worldwide through the normal operation
of technology markets that are increasingly global and free from bar-
riers.  However, over time, additional incentives, such as a tax to limit
greenhouse gas emissions, would be needed to ensure that a growing
fraction of the world market faces the appropriate incentive and thus
applies new technologies in the field.  These additional incentives will
require broader international cooperation, but a regime that begins
with technology in the core centers of innovation will have three ad-
vantages over conventional approaches to addressing global warming.
First, there is a good theoretical basis for beginning a technology-
oriented approach in the liberal nations—namely, they are the centers
of innovation.  Second, technological innovation will lower the cost of
abatement and thus reduce the size of the tax that will ultimately be
needed to spur these new technologies into field application else-
where.  Since the problems of international cooperation appear to
grow exponentially with the size of the intervention and the number
of countries, the practical political benefits of lower abatement costs
158. See Climate Change Convention, supra note 3.
159. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 128.
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are likely to be substantial.  Third, for a technology-oriented strategy
to be effective over the long run will require that all nations under-
take market reforms—such as lowering market barriers and ensuring
protection of intellectual property—which will make it easier for new
technologies to enter the market.  This could be a productive link be-
tween the efforts to slow global warming and the WTO, which al-
ready obliges many similar market-liberating policies on its members.
It could also provide some political cover by giving developing coun-
tries something to do while not requiring arbitrary caps on their emis-
sions.
A regime that is focused on the core, industrialized nations could
be effective, but it may not earn the consent of the public and legisla-
tures in those nations unless it is coupled with a visible effort else-
where in the world.  Since the non-liberal nations generally do not
want to implement costly actions, a broader effort will be largely
symbolic (unless it is fully compensated).  With that sharp political
constraint, it is perhaps best to get the symbols right and focus minds
on free markets and diffusion of technology.
This proposal will initially seem bizarre and wrongheaded—and
much less elegant than a pure carbon tax or a trading system.  The
new technology approach does not completely avoid the need to build
international institutions to promote cooperation and monitoring.
Yet, a new technology approach may be the only logical solution that
justifies an intensive effort restricted to those countries that have
demonstrated the greatest capacity to cooperate.
V.  CONCLUSION
“Compliance” is a poor indicator of the effectiveness of interna-
tional environmental cooperation.  Often compliance has been high
even when commitments have had little or no influence on behav-
ior.160  For scholars, this point suggests the need for great care in de-
fining the dependent variable.  For policymakers, this point lays bare
a major barrier to deeper cooperation: today’s “standard model” for
addressing international environmental issues, which focuses on cre-
160. Ironically, compliance with some non-binding commitments—such as in the North
Sea—has been low, but the commitments have been highly effective. See Jon Birger Skjærseth,
The Making and Implementation of North Sea Commitments: The Politics of Environmental
Participation, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS, supra note 4, at 327, 368-
71.  See generally David G. Victor, The Use of Effectiveness of Nonbinding Instruments in the
Management of Complex International Environmental Problems, 1997 PROC. AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L. 241.
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ating binding international law, has been designed to yield high com-
pliance.  However, the good record of compliance is misleading.  The
record shows that cooperation is possible under some restrictive con-
ditions.  Cooperation has surmounted shallowness primarily when it
has been limited to liberal nations that have strong legal institutions
and policies that demand action to solve environmental problems.
Cooperation has also been effective in changing behavior and solving
environmental problems when reluctant parties are compensated.
Enforcement has been necessary in cases where countries have
faced inconvenient commitments.  The mode of enforcement has not
been top-down and centralized; rather, a mixture of formal and in-
formal procedures has been implemented.  Typically, the most politi-
cally sensitive tasks are performed by mechanisms that are formally
external to the international legal institutions created to handle com-
pliance problems.  This experience shows that enforcement is neces-
sary, especially as international agreements yield more stringent
commitments that countries will not implement purely on the basis of
internal pressure and self-interest.  The experience also suggests that
the most effective institutions for performing such enforcement will
not be entirely formalized; there appears to be a tradeoff between the
extent of formalization and the power of the institution.  That trade-
off need not hold if there is a consensus that strong institutions are
needed, but it does suggest that efforts to develop international legal
instruments that require strong enforcement also give close attention
to how that enforcement will be supplied.
These observations do not bode well for efforts to slow global
warming.  They suggest that there is a need to develop institutions
that will be capable of monitoring and enforcement—policymakers
should not be overly encouraged about the good record of compli-
ance in other areas of international environmental law because it is
problem-solving, not legal compliance, that matters.  Moreover, these
observations suggest that there is a special advantage to focusing the
most demanding international commitments on the advanced indus-
trialized nations—that is, nations with strong legal institutions, a de-
manding and powerful public, and the best record of international
environmental cooperation.  Global warming is difficult to address in
part because the majority of emissions comes from countries that are
not in that “zone of law.”  However, one approach—investment in
technological innovation—makes sense when limited to the select
group of nations that are most likely to cooperate effectively.
